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2 
ARGUMENT 
1. BECAUSE OF THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO PROPERLY 
CONDUCT A THOROUGH AND COMPREHENSIVE INQUIRY AND 
COLLOQUY, DEFENDANT DID NOT KNOWINGLY, INTELLIGENTLY, 
AND VOLUNTARILY WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL. 
In its Brief, the State acknowledges that in cases such as the 
instant case a trial court has a duty "to determine if this waiver is 
a voluntary one which is knowingly and intelligently made." State v. 
Frampton, 737 P.2d 183, 187 (Utah 1987). Furthermore, it is well-
settled that a defendant in such circumstances as the instant case 
"should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation, so that the record will establish that xhe knows what 
he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.'" Faretta v. 
California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975) (quoting Adams v. United States 
ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942)). "Ideally, the trial judge 
should conduct a thorough and comprehensive formal inquiry of the 
defendant on the record to demonstrate that the defendant is aware of 
the nature of the charges, the range of allowable punishments and 
possible defenses, and is fully informed of the risks of proceeding 
pro se." United States v. Willie, 941 F.2d 1384, 1388 (10th Cir. 
1991), cert denied, 502 U.S. 1106 (1992) (emphasis added); see also 
Frampton, 737 P. 2d at 187 (recognizing, generally, that the trial 
court's advise to a defendant about the dangers and disadvantages of 
self-representation "can only be elicited after penetrating 
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self-representation "can only be elicited after penetrating 
questioning by the trial court" to insure that "defendants understand 
the risks of self-representation") (emphasis added)). 
In the instant case, the trial court failed to adequately 
question or advise Defendant so as to make him aware of the dangers 
and disadvantages of self-representation (see R. 96-98, Jury Trial 
Transcript (Volume I)); see also Brief of Appellant, pp. 28-35. 
Rather, the trial court focused almost solely on Defendant's 
background {id.). Instructive of the trial court's failure is State 
v. Ruple, 631 P.2d 874 (Utah 1981), where after the defendant choose 
to represent himself, the trial court briefly explained to the 
defendant the procedure to be followed for the balance of the trial. 
Id. at 875. In the course of reversing the trial court's 
determination of waiver and remanding for a new trial, the Utah 
Supreme Court emphasized that the trial court "did not discuss with 
the defendant the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. 
[The trial court] did not advise the defendant that it is generally 
advisable to have a lawyer who is skilled and trained in the law, and 
[it] did not point out to the defendant any of the hazards he may 
encounter by acting pro se." Id. at 876; Cf. State v. Drobel, 815 
P.2d 724, 730, 732 (affirming trial court's determination of waiver 
due to the record wherein trial court's "careful colloquys" with the 
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defendant followed the points set forth in Frampton "in essence if 
not verbatim"); and State v. Dominguez, 564 P.2d 768 (Utah 1977) 
(affirming the defendant's waiver of the right to the assistance of 
counsel in light of the defendant's being fully advised of the 
dangers and disadvantages of proceeding without the aid of an 
attorney and the trial court's meticulous questioning of the 
defendant). Any discussion or analysis of Ruple is noticeably absent 
in the State's brief. 
Because the trial court's failure, among other things, to 
discuss with Defendant the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation, this Court is unable to assess, on appeal, whether 
Defendant validly waived his constitutional right to the assistance 
of counsel. See State v. Bakalov, 862 P. 2d at 1355 (citing Bakalov, 
849 P.2d at 637); see also McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 
n.8, 104 S.Ct. 944, 950 n.8 (1984) ("Since the right of self-
representation is a right that when exercised usually increases the 
likelihood of a trial outcome unfavorable to the defendant, it s 
denial is not amenable to "harmless error" analysis). 
Finally, by pointing to isolated points in the transcript of the 
trial, the State argues that Defendant's performance was "impressive" 
and that therefore a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to 
counsel was made. See Brief of Appellee, pp. 15-16. The State, 
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however, neglects to recognize that there are several instances 
during the proceedings evidencing Defendant's utter confusion. For 
example, at one point during that first day of the jury trial, after 
a lengthy discussion between the trial court and counsel concerning 
side bar conferences and whether or not proper Miranda warnings had 
been administered by the police in the instant case, Defendant 
interjected with the following comment: "Your Honor, I don't know 
really about what all of these big words is going on, but the last 
officer he did not read me my Miranda rights at all. He just went 
right into questions." (R. 308, lines 18-21, Jury Trial Transcript 
(Volume I)). Nothing else was mentioned about this during the trial. 
Another example is that on the second day of the jury trial, while 
Defendant presented his case-in-chief and attempted to refer to a 
police report, the following exchange took place: 
MR. McDONALD: I would like to show this paper, this 
police report to the jury. 
THE COURT: It's not offered, you can't show it to 
them, Mr. McDonald. 
MR. McDONALD: I would like to refer to the police 
report. Can I? 
THE COURT: You cannot refer to the police report 
unless you do it through the witness who wrote it. 
MR. McDONALD: Is that witness here? 
THE COURT: I don't know who wrote it. 
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MR. McDONALD: It says Clearfield Police Department. 
THE COURT: That doesn't tell you who wrote it, which 
of the officers wrote it. At any rate, you can't use 
it with this witness. You've got to use it with some 
other witness. 
MR. McDONALD: All right. 
(R. 400-401, Jury Trial Transcript (Volume II)). Thereafter, 
Defendant did not attempt to refer to the police report and there is 
no indication in the record that standby counsel attempted to assist 
Defendant in referring to the police report as evidence. Probably 
the most obvious example lack of knowledge and experience is the 
following exchange between Defendant and the trial court during the 
Pretrial Hearing in the instant case: 
MR. ALBRIGHT: Mr. McDonald had a question for the 
Court. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. McDONALD: Yes. I would like to know what kind of 
law am I standing in. Is this a constitutional right 
or what is this, just a Maritime law or what? 
THE COURT: It has nothing to do with Maritime laws. 
You are under the laws of the State of Utah which are 
statute in nature and guaranteed by both the 
Constitution of this State and the United States. 
MR. McDONALD: All right. 
(R. 55-56, Transcript of Pretrial Hearing) (emphasis added). 
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2 . THE TRIAL COURT AND THE PROSECUTOR BREACHED THEIR DUTY 
TO DEFENDANT BY ALLOWING FORMER TRIAL COUNSEL TO BE 
APPOINTED AS STANDBY COUNSEL. 
In its argument concerning standby counsel, the State fails to 
recognize that when a trial court appoints standby counsel in cases 
such as this, both the court and the prosecutor have a duty to 
investigate the apparent conflict of interest further and not to 
appoint trial counsel that appears to have an apparent substantial 
conflict of interest. See Brief of Appellant, pp. 41-46. To do 
otherwise, would make the constitutional right to self-representation 
an empty right at best. See State v. Frampton, 737 P. 2d 183, 187 
(Utah 1987) (holding that an accused's right to conduct his own 
defense "must be respected and guarded by the courts in harmony with 
the right to assistance of counsel, also guaranteed by the sixth 
amendment") (emphasis added); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 
835 n.46 95 S.Ct. 2525 (1975) (recognizing the appointment of standby 
counsel to assist a defendant in exercising the right to self-
representation) / and State v. Bakalov, 862 P. 2d 1354, 1355 (Utah 
19 93) (urging the trial court, upon remand, "to appoint standby 
counsel to preserve [the defendant's] right to self-representation 
and to preclude subsequent claims of lack of waiver or ineffective 
assistance of counsel") (emphasis added). As is indicated by the 
argument in Defendant's brief, as well the previously cited cases, 
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the right to self-representation is well-established by United States 
Supreme Court and Utah case law. By way of argument in its brief, 
the State would have this Court believe that Defendant's argument 
simply revolves around the appointment to standby counsel. Not so; 
Defendant's argument is substantially premised upon the right to 
self-representation and the duty of the trial court and prosecutor to 
protect that right, especially when, as in the instant case, there is 
an obvious and significant potential conflict of interest between the 
defendant and appointed trial counsel and trial counsel is 
subsequently appointed as standby counsel. See Wood v. Georgia, 450 
U.S. 261, 272 n. 18, 101 S.Ct. 1097, 1104 n.18 (1981) (stating that 
a conflict situation that is not addressed by the trial court 
requires reversal) (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 347, 
100 S.Ct. 1708, 1717 (1980)). 
Finally, the State argues that Defendant must establish that 
standby counsel labored under an actual conflict of interest. See 
Brief of Appellee, p. 19-20. However, in Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 
261, 101 S.Ct. 1097 (1981), the United States Supreme Court stated 
that Sullivan mandates a reversal when the trial court has failed to 
make an inquiry even though it 'knows or reasonably should know that 
a particular conflict exists."' Id. at 272 n.18, 101 S.Ct. at 1104 
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n.18 (emphasis in original) (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 
335, 347, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1717 (1980)). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Defendant respectfully asks that the 
Court reverse his conviction and remand the case for a new trial so 
that Defendant might be receive, among other things, proper advise as 
to the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation for a valid 
waiver and, if Defendant chooses to represent himself, so that the 
conflict of interest issue can be adequately addressed and resolved 
to preserve Defendant's right to self-representation. 
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT 
AND METHOD OF DISPOSITION 
Defendant requests oral argument inasmuch as oral argument will 
materially enhance the decisional process due to the complex and 
significant issues in the instant appeal dealing with the 
constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel, which is a 
matter of continuing public interest, and which case involves issues 
requiring further development in the area of criminal law. Counsel 
for Defendant further requests that the method of disposition of the 
instant appeal be by opinion designated by the Court "For Official 
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Publication" for purposes of precedential value to aid defense 
counsel. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2nd day of May, 1996. 
HOLMGREN, ARNOLD & WIGGINS, L.C. 
L^ WiggJLhs 
Defendants for Defendant 
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